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Abstract: How does a group’s gender composition influence its decisions? 
Economists have found women to be more generous and egalitarian than 
men,  so  one  might  expect  groups  with  more  women  to  be  more 
generous/egalitarian.  Group  polarization,  whereby  discussions  amplify 
preexisting  attitudes  (a  phenomenon  well-established  in  psychology), 
would  enhance  that  effect.  We  report  experimental  evidence.  Female-
majority groups are more generous/egalitarian than male-majority groups, 
but  female  unisex  groups  are  not  the  most  generous/egalitarian.  We 
discuss how these findings accord with our derived conjectures, and what 
can  be  learned  regarding  the  influence  of  gender  composition  on 
committee decision-making more generally. 
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1. Introduction 
In March 2002 the Norwegian Minister for Trade and Industry, Ansgar Gabrielsen, 
proposed forcing companies to have at least 40 percent women on their boards of 
directors,  unless  this  had  already  taken  place  by  2005.
1  In  November  2002,  the 
Swedish Deputy Prime Minister Margareta Winberg demanded at least a 25 percent 
share for women board members by 2004.
2 There are indications that these threats are 
having an effect: a recent Swedish government inquiry set the current share of women 
board members in private companies at 13 percent, up from 5 percent in 1993;
3 in 
Swedish state-owned companies the share of women on boards has now risen to 40 
percent;
4 in Norway the share of women on the boards of the 100 largest companies 
has surged to 20 percent.
5 Although politicians in most other countries have not taken 
as strong stands on women’s influence on company decision-making, there has been 
plenty of debate and lobbying on the issue and the shares of women on boards may be 
on the rise there too. 
The 10 000 dollar question is whether and how the presence of women, or the 
relative  balance  of  women  and  men  on  a  decision-making  committee,  matters  for 
corporate conduct. We do not think the answer is known. In fact, it seems that little 
research  has  examined  any  aspect  of  how  gender  composition  influences  group 
performance.
6 Our paper is motivated against this background. We observe groups of 
three  people  dividing  a  sum  of  money  between  themselves  and  another  (fourth) 
                                                            
1 See the archive service of the Norwegian government at http://odin.dep.no  
2 Svenska Dagbladet 2002/11/25. 
3 SOU 2003:16 
4 Dagens Nyheter 2003/05/12 
5 See http://www.managementwomen.no/november2002.php  
6 There are a number of studies on gender and entrepreneurial decisions, but they seem to focus on 
individual traits rather than group composition. Sonfield, Lussier, Corman & McKinney (2001) survey 
the results.   2
person. (This is a version of the team-dictator game, introduced by Cason & Mui, 
1997.)  The  gender  composition  differs  across  groups,  and  we  explore  how  this 
influences  decision-making.  Our  chosen  line  of  research  is  thus  concerned  with  a 
simpler environment than boards of directors and may therefore dodge the 10 000 
dollar question. However, we hope that the insights we gain may guide or inspire 
future research geared to tackling the big issue. In research as in quiz shows, one may 
have to answer low-stake questions before high-stake ones. 
Results from two strands of research in experimental economics combine to 
suggest that the gender composition of groups may well influence decisions. First, 
recent research on individual economic decisions in dictator games (i.e., a game in 
which  one  person  divides  a  sum  of  money  between  her-  or  himself  and  another 
person) suggests that men and women make different decisions. For example, Eckel 
& Grossman (1998) find that women are more generous,
7 and Andreoni & Vesterlund 
(2001) find that women are more "egalitarian" in the sense that they choose an equal 
division of the pie more often. Second, experiments comparing individual and group 
decisions (a literature belonging partly in social psychology), document interesting 
differences.
8  
Now  if  men  and  women  make  different  decisions,  and  if  groups  and 
individuals make different decisions, there is every reason to believe that the gender 
composition  of  groups  matters  for  their  decisions.  In  particular,  in  light  of  the 
aforementioned  results  in  experimental  economics  by  Eckel  &  Grossman  and 
Andreoni & Vesterlund, one might expect that the more women there are in a group 
                                                            
7 This result is not entirely uncontested, and may depend on a variety of design details. Cf Bolton & 
Katok (1995), Andreoni & Vesterlund, Fershtman & Gneeezy (2001) Ben-Ner, Kong & Putterman 
(2002), and Dufwenberg & Muren (2002). 
8 See Cason & Mui (1997), Bornstein & Yaniv (1998), Cox & Hayne (2002), Hennig-Schmidt (2002), 
Kocher & Sutter (2002), and the references therein.   3
the  more  generous  and  egalitarian  its  decisions  will  be.  This  conjecture  can  be 
supported  further  with  reference  to  the  phenomenon  of  group  polarization, 
empirically well-established by psychologists. This is a tendency for group discussion 
to strengthen the initial inclinations of the group members, making groups of like-
minded  people  more  extreme  than  the  group's  average  member.  The  group 
polarization phenomenon was first pointed out by Moscovici & Zavalloni (1969), and 
has subsequently been confirmed for a variety of personal inclinations. Myers (2002), 
a standard social psychology textbook, gives a nice overview (pp. 300-308).
9 
We test several hypotheses concerning how gender composition influences the 
generosity  or  egalitarianism  of  groups.  The  group  polarization  phenomenon,  as 
applied to the received view that women are more generous and egalitarian, is tested 
alongside. If it turns out that group generosity or egalitarianism is not monotonous in 
the number of women, then this form of group polarization is rejected. 
The study most closely related to ours is that by Cason & Mui, who study 
decision-making  in  a  team  dictator  game  with  a  group  of  two  persons  making  a 
dictator decision. Their focus differs from ours in that their experiment is set up to (i) 
compare behavior in team dictator and standard dictator games, and (ii) to distinguish 
between two competing explanations for group polarization.
10 By contrast, our focus 
is on the role of gender composition,
11 and since we have groups of three (rather than 
two) making choices we can also say something about the difference between unisex 
                                                            
9  According  to  Myers,  risk  takers  become  riskier,  bigots  become  despisers,  givers  become  more 
philantropic, nerds become nerdier, jocks become jockier. Group polarization helps explain judgments 
of guilt in courts, sunk cost fallacies in investment, student development in schools, gang delinquency, 
terrorism, massacres, and how the internet may make opinions more extreme as "peacemakers and neo-
Nazis, geeks and goths, conspiracy theorists and cancer survivors" interact on dedicated pages. 
10 The competing explanations are called social comparison theory and persuasive argument theory; cf 
Myers's discussion of normative and informational influence. 
11 Cason & Mui recorded data on the gender composition of their groups, and they have some results 
on this, although clearly the impact of gender composition is not the main focus of their paper.    4
groups and groups which are not unisex but still have a strict majority of persons of a 
given sex. 
The next section contains all the material related to the experiment. Finally, 
we have a section with a concluding discussion. 
 
2. The experiment 
In this section we present (in three subsections) first the design of the experiment, 
then the hypotheses we propose to test, and finally the results. 
 
The design 
The experiment was carried out in two sessions (I and II), both held at Stockholm 
University during the fall of 2001. The subjects were students in the one-semester 
introductory course for prospective teachers. The introductory course consisted of a 
sequence  of  lectures  introducing  different  fields  of  study,  and  the  experimental 
session was made a part of the only lecture in this sequence that covered economics. 
The subjects had thus not had any economics before participating in the experiment. 
At the beginning of the lecture, students were asked if they were interested in 
participating in an experiment. It was made clear that participation was voluntary. 
Each participant was given a slip of paper, and all were asked to write their first name 
on their slip. The slips were collected and one or two of them (depending on the 
session, see below) were drawn at random. The names written on these were copied 
onto a separate paper, which was put into an envelope and sealed.
12 The slips were 
                                                            
12 The subjects could not check at the time which name was copied onto the paper and sealed in the 
envelope. However, they could confirm afterwards that it was the name of a person in the class.   5
then replaced. This part of the experiment took place before the 15-minute break in 
the lecture. 
During the break all slips were arranged into groups of three and each group 
was assigned a number. On a separate protocol that was not circulated, the group 
numbers associated with each of the four possible gender compositions were listed. 
When entering the lecture hall after the break, subjects were told their group number 
and the first names of the other subjects in their group. When subjects had identified 
their fellow group members they were asked to sit down together. The lecture halls 
used were large and the groups sat well apart from one another. The instruction sheets 
were distributed (see the Appendix for a translation of the complete instructions) and 
the groups were given 5-10 minutes to make their decisions. 
The decision that each group had to make was how to split the sum of 1000 
kronor
13 between the group and an anonymous person, or in other words how much to 
give to an anonymous recipient. It was made clear that the money allocated to the 
group would be divided equally between the members of the group. The instructions 
explained that one (two in Session II) group(s) would be randomly selected to receive 
their self-determined share in cash. The sum that they had decided to give to the 
anonymous person would then be given to the pre-selected recipient(s). 
The groups made their decisions and submitted them by writing the sum that 
they allocated to the anonymous person, together with their group number, on the 
instruction sheet. Instruction sheets were collected, and payments were made after the 
end of class. The time taken for the session (except for payments) was approximately 
30 minutes, 10 minutes before the break and 20 minutes after the break. 
 
                                                            
13 1000 kronor was approximately 110 euros or US dollars at the time of the experiment.   6
Hypotheses 
We would expect a gender difference in expressed group preferences to be rooted in 
individual  differences  and  transformed  or  aggregated  in  some  way  by  the  group 
decision.  The  particular way  in  which  individual  preferences  are  translated  into  a 
group decision might have implications for how a "group gender effect" should be 
defined.  Our  first  test  concerns  whether  a  group  gender  effect  will  emerge  as  a 
difference between groups where women are in the majority and groups where men 
are  in  the  majority.  If  this  is  the  case  we  should  be  able  to  reject  the  following 
hypothesis. 
 
H1:  Female-majority  groups  and  male-majority  groups  make  the  same 
donations.  
 
By  a  similar  line  of  reasoning,  a  group  gender  effect  in  the  inclination  to 
decide  on  the  egalitarian  donation  of  the  pie  would  imply  a  difference  between 
female-majority and male-majority groups. In this experiment, the total sum will be 
shared equally between the three individuals in the dictator group and the recipient if 
the donation is exactly 250 kronor. A group gender effect in egalitarianism exists if 
we can reject H1* below. 
 
H1*:  Female-majority  groups  and  male-majority  groups  give  250  kronor 
equally often.  
 
We next compare pairs of group types with different gender composition, to 
test if group generosity changes with the number of women in the group. There are 
three relevant group type differences to test for: all-female groups are compared with   7
groups with two women and one man, groups with two women and one man are 
compared with groups with two men and one woman, and groups with two men and 
one woman are compared with all-male groups. The appropriate hypothesis for all 
three tests is formulated generally as H2 below, and it is applied to each of the three 
different relevant datasets. 
 
H2:  Groups  make  the  same  donations  in  pair-wise  comparisons  when  the 
number of women is increased by one. 
 
The corresponding hypothesis for egalitarianism is: 
 
H2*: Groups give 250 kronor equally often in pair-wise comparisons when the 
number of women is increased by one.  
 
Finally,  we  will  test  the  ranking  across  all  four  groups  in  generosity  and 
egalitarianism.  To  be  precise,  we  will  test  whether  group  generosity  increases  or 
decreases in a monotonous way with the number of women in the group. We will test 
for  a  trend  in  group  egalitarianism  in  the  same  way.  If  there  is  such  a  trend  in 
generosity or egalitarianism we will be able to reject H3 or H3* below. 
 
H3: There is no trend in generosity if the four group types are ordered by the 
number of women.  
 
H3*: There is no trend in egalitarianism if the four group types are ordered by 
the number of women.  
 
   8
Results 
Altogether 168 persons, comprising 56 groups, participated in the experiment. Session 
I had 63 participants in 21 groups; Session II had 105 participants in 35 groups. In 
Session I seven of the students elected not to participate in the experiment, while in 
Session II all the students present at the lecture participated in the experiment. There 
are four different possibilities for the gender-composition of a group of three people: 
all-female, two women and one man, one woman and two men, and all-male. We will 
use the following notation for these cases: 
 
   FFF = all-female 
    FFM = two women and one man 
    FMM = one woman and two men 
    MMM = three men  
 
Table 1 shows the number of participating groups for each type of gender-
composition in the two sessions. 
 
Table 1: Number of participating groups, by session 
  FFF  FFM  FMM  MMM 
Session 1  11  1  9  0 
Session 2  15  11  1  8 
TOTAL  26  12  10  8 
 
There were a lot more women than men in the subject group as a whole, and 
also in each session. Because of this, there are more than twice as many all-female 
groups as the number of any other kind of group. We have tested for a difference in 
the  distributions  of  donations  between  Sessions  I  and  II  and  found  no  significant   9
session effect on donations (P-value 0.82 in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and P-value 
0.40 in a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). We will thus only discuss results in terms of 
the whole dataset of 56 groups. 
An overall view of the data is found in Table 2, which shows the distribution 
of donated amounts among all the 56 groups.  It is remarkable that all the data is 
distributed over exactly eight different amounts. This occurred even though the groups 
had  at  least  1001  alternative  amounts  to  donate,  since  any  integer  between  and 
including 0 and 1000 was clearly allowed by the instructions (see the Appendix).
14 
 
Table 2: Number of donations at each of the donated sums for all 56 groups 




































The mean donation across all groups is 218 kronor and the median is 250 
kronor. The latter is the egalitarian donation since it gives 250 kronor to each group 
member. Table 3 shows means and medians when the data is partitioned into female-
majority and male-majority groups. 
 
Table 3: Mean (and median) amounts donated for female-majority (FFF + FFM) 
versus male-majority (FMM + MMM) groups 
FFF+FFM  FMM+MMM 
225 (250)  203 (100) 
 
                                                            
14 Note that the amounts 1 kronor, 10 kronor, 100 kronor, 250 kronor, 400 kronor and 1000 kronor 
share the characteristic that the remainder (999 kronor, 990 kronor, 900 kronor, 750 kronor, 600 kronor 
and 0 kronor) can obviously and easily be divided by three.    10
The  same  pattern  exists  in  means  and  medians, namely  that  male-majority 
groups  appear  to  donate  less  than  female-majority  groups.  Next  we  check  if  this 
difference holds up to statistical testing. Since we do not have a definite opinion on 
whether it would be reasonable to exclude a difference in one of the two possible 
directions, the appropriate alternative hypothesis is that the donations differ in either 
direction, i.e. a two-sided alternative. We first test H1. The hypothesis that the two 
samples  of  donations  from  female-majority  and  male-majority  groups  are  from 
populations with the same distribution is rejected in a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 
(P-value 0.03). 
Moving to egalitarianism and the hypothesis H1*, we first note that 30 out of 
the 56 groups donated 250 kronor. Table 4 shows the relative number of egalitarian 
donations for female-majority and male-majority groups. 
 
Table 4: Number of egalitarian donations relative to total number for female-majority 
(FFF + FFM) versus male-majority (FMM + MMM) groups 
FFF+FFM  FMM+MMM 
25 / 38  5 / 18 
 
The egalitarian donation of 250 kronor is particularly frequent in the female-
majority groups. Testing for equality of proportions the difference is significant (P-
value 0.008). H1* is rejected.  
We summarize the results on gender majority effects: 
 
OBSERVATION  1: Female-majority  groups  are  more  generous  and  more 
egalitarian than male-majority groups. 
   11
Next we look at donations across all four types of groups, and hypothesis H2. 
Table 5 shows means and medians of donated amounts. 
 
Table 5: Mean (and median) amount donated for each type of group 
FFF  FFM  FMM  MMM 
189 (250)  304 (250)  195 (100)  334 (100) 
 
Our  previous  result  that  female  majority  groups  are  more  generous,  is  in 
accordance with our conjecture that women are more generous. We would then expect 
different  donations  also  in  pair-wise  comparisons  when  the  number  of  women  is 
increased by one: FFF vs. FFM, FFM vs. FMM, and FMM vs. MMM. Testing for 
statistical  significance,  the  difference  between  the  FFF  and  the  FFM  groups  is 
significant  (P-value  0.04)  and  so  is  the  difference  between  the  FFM  and  FMM 
groups (P-value 0.03), while the difference between the FMM and MMM groups is 
not (P-value 0.68).  
However, we note that the difference between the FFF and FFM groups goes 
in the opposite direction from what our gender majority result would suggest about 
generosity and the number of women. It actually implies that the combination of two 
women and one man is the most generous gender composition! 
Investigating egalitarianism and hypothesis H2*, we find the relative numbers 
of egalitarian donations for the four types of gender-composition in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Number of egalitarian donations relative to total number per type of group  
FFF  FFM  FMM  MMM 
16 / 26  9 / 12  3 / 10  2 / 8 
   12
Only the FFM vs. FMM test delivers a significant result (P-value 0.03), while 
neither the FFF and FFM groups, nor the FMM and MMM groups, are significantly 
different (P-values are 0.42 and 0.81, respectively). 
 
OBSERVATION 2:  
(i) When the number of women in a group increases from one to two, groups 
become significantly more generous and egalitarian. 
(ii) When the number of women in a group increases from two to three, groups 
become significantly less generous. 
 
We will now consider the data explicitly from the point of view of the ranking 
of all four groups according to the number of women and consider hypothesis H3. We 
will investigate whether or not generosity and egalitarianism increase in the number 
of women across all four groups. Thus we test for a trend for the ordering FFF, FFM, 
FMM, MMM, using a nonparametric test for trends across ordered groups based on 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
15 There is no significant trend (P-value 0.19) for 
this ordering.
16 
Testing for trends in the frequency of egalitarian donations as stated in 
hypothesis H3* yields a significant trend for the ordering FFF, FFM, FMM, MMM 
(P-value 0.03).
17 We summarize these results below. 
 
OBSERVATION  3:  The  trend  in  donations  across  groups  rejects  the 
hypothesis that generosity increases with the number of women. The trend in 
egalitarianism does not reject the hypothesis. 
 
                                                            
15 The test is the nptrend test in Stata. 
16 If groups are ordered as: FFM, FFF, FMM, MMM or FFM, FFF, MMM, FMM we find 
significant trends (P-values 0.01 for both cases).   13
The finding that FFM groups are more generous than FFF groups, while at the same 
time female-majority groups are more generous than male-majority groups, suggests a 
non-monotonous relation between the number of women in a group and the generosity 
of that group. The finding that the most generous groups are those with two women 
and one man, rather than the groups with three women (or three men), implies that our 




We  find  evidence  of  a  gender  effect  in  group  decisions:  female-majority 
groups act in a more other-regarding way than male majority groups by giving more 
to the individual recipient, and female-majority groups choose the egalitarian division 
of the pie more often than male-majority groups do. We also have a result that speaks 
against group polarization: it is the groups with two women and one man who are the 
most generous ones, instead of the all-female groups which is what group polarization 
would lead us to expect. This is interesting in itself but it is also puzzling.  
One  way  of  thinking  about  groups  with  two  women  and  one  man  being 
particularly generous is that women may perceive themselves as different from men, 
and that the presence of a man triggers an exaggerated generosity among the women 
in the group. Although this argument may appear speculative, a somewhat related 
observation is made in Stockard, van de Kragt & Dodge (1988). They study a public 
goods game and find no gender differences in actual, individually determined and 
anonymous cooperation. However, their female subjects were much more likely to 
"justify their behaviour as being altruistic and principled". Stockard et al interpret this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
17 The other two orderings are however more strongly significant (P-values are again 0.01 for both   14
to mean that women are more eager than men to appear altruistic. If we combine this 
finding  with  the  idea  that  women  might  use  male  altruism  as  a  neutral  level  for 
comparison, it could be taken as a possible explanation of our finding. Two women 
would then want to be more generous when the third person in the group is a man, 
than when the third person is a woman. 
What, if anything, have we learned of relevance to the 10 000 dollar question, 
about the effect of gender composition on corporate conduct? The main insight is 
perhaps  just  a  call  to  take  the  matter  seriously.  We  have  documented  several 
statistically significant differences for a simple environment, offering a presumption 
that gender composition matters in more complicated environments too. However, 
several concerns, that may be influenced by gender composition and which may well 
be important in corporate boards, have not been addressed in our design:  
-  Other  personality  traits  than  generosity  and  egalitarianism  may  matter.  
For example, when men and women compete men have been found to exhibit 
more competitiveness than women (see Gneezy, Niederle & Rustichini, 2003; 
Gneezy & Rustichini, 2003).  
-  Groups  have  histories,  which  may  matter  to  gender  composition  effects.  For  
example, the effect of having two women on a corporate board may depend on  
whether or not there is a history of one woman on the board. 
-  We  have  mainly  discussed  how  individual  traits  influence  group  decisions,  
but  there  may  be  effects  running  in  the  other  direction.  Board  membership  
may,  for  example,  over  time  influence  personality  traits  of  board  members,  
and gender composition may matter in this connection. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
FFM, FFF, FMM, MMM and FFM, FFF, MMM, FMM cases).     15
We  hope  this  list  of  omissions  will  be  helpful  for  future  research  on  the  
importance  of  gender  composition  to  corporate  conduct,  and  on  group  
decision-making more generally. 
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Appendix: Instructions 
Below is a translation of the Swedish instruction sheet used in the experiment in the 








You are hereby invited to take part in an experiment. Your task is to divide the sum of 
1000 kronor between your group and a randomly selected person who is also taking 
the introductory course for prospective teachers and who is participating in today's 
lecture. The group's share of the money will be divided equally between the members 
of the group. Participation in the experiment is voluntary. You participate by filling in 
and handing in this form here and now. 
 
All who take part in the experiment have a chance of winning money. At the lecture 
this afternoon we will select one group [two groups] randomly (identified only by a 
number) which will receive payment according to its decision. The person[s] affected 
by the group's decision will be selected randomly. The identity[ies] of this [these] 
person[s] will then be revealed. Each of the persons involved can receive their money 
(minus taxes) directly or by contacting us no later than October 15 [December 17], 




Your job is to determine a division of 1000 kronor between the group and a randomly 
selected person who is also taking the introductory course for prospective teachers 
and who is participating in today's lecture. The division must add up to 1000 kronor 
for your answer to be valid. It is important that you in the group choose your division 
without discussing it with other groups. Make your decision by filling in a sum below: 
 
 
  DIVISION:    _____________ kronor to us 
 
      +_____________ kronor to the randomly selected person 
 
      = ____________ 1000 kronor 
 
 
Your answer will be collected shortly. 
 
 
Your group number:____________________ 
 